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This article contributes to the design and the verification of trusted components and services.
The contracts are declined at several levels to cover then different facets, such as component
consistency, compatibility or correctness. The article introduces multilevel contracts and a
design+verification process for handling and analysing these contracts in component models.
The approach is implemented with the COSTO platform that supports the Kmelia component
model. A case study illustrates the overall approach.
1 Introduction
Component-Based Software Engineering (CBSE) using off-the-shelf components is one approach
to deal with the software complexity. Since the components may be developed by third-parties,
assembling them requires means to ensure the correctness of the component behaviours and
their interoperability. This requires first that the components have rich interface descriptions
and second the availability of a verification process to check the given properties. In our work
we tackle the issue of building trusted components by the means of contracts.
As a component is usually defined as ”an unit of composition with contractually specified
interfaces and explicit context dependencies only” [27], the notion of contract appears to be
a natural solution to express and to organise component specification and verification. The
contracts are suitable to express properties such as the component’s consistency preservation or
the component interoperability. By contract we mainly refer to contract-based design [20] which
extended the use of Hoare assertions (pre/post-conditions, invariant) at design and programming
levels. But contracts may have different meanings depending on the context (component or
assembly of components) or the facet (signature, structure, assertions, dynamics) [25, 10, 12].
Therefore we use the term multilevel contract in this work.
In order to improve the confidence of the components and their assemblies, it is necessary
to make contracts explicit [10]. This demands a strong emphasis on their analyzability early
in development process and a way to ensure systematically the correctness of the components
with respect to the contracts. However, most of today component-based technologies lack formal
analysis tools to ensure the component dependability. Our work contributes in satisfying this
need.
The contribution of this article is as follows. We consider a multilevel contract approach
which covers a specification activity and an analysis activity realised by verification techniques.
We show (i) how the contracts can be defined at different levels (service, component, assembly)
of a component model in order to specify several kinds of correctness properties and (ii) how the
contracts can be checked. The demonstration applies to our experimental Kmelia component
model and its language. The core of the data language of Kmelia is a first order logic, it is
extended with user-defined data types and related statements; the behaviour language is based on
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transition systems. We experiment this proposal with the COSTO (COmponent Study TOolkit),
a toolbox associated to the Kmelia model. Yet Kmelia/COSTO enables us to experiment at an
abstract level, with medium size systems with intensive data and client-provider interaction
style.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the multilevel
contract approach; the considered levels and the contracts are made explicit. In Section 3
we overview the global design and verification process based on the multilevel contracts. Our
contract approach is implemented in the Kmelia component model; Section 4 describes how
contracts are integrated at different levels. The support case study is a simple bank Automatic
Teller Machine (ATM). Section 5 illustrates the verification process in the case of Kmelia and the
experimentations on the ATM case study. In Section 6 we discuss related approaches. Finally
Section 7 concludes the article and describes planed extensions of this work.
2 Using Multi-levels Contracts in Component Models
In this section we assume a general service component model where a component interface is
defined by one or several services expressing provided or required functionalities; a component
may be assembled with other components via its interface; a component may have invariant
properties; a service may have a dynamic behaviour including interactions with other service
components. According to [21], a Trusted Component is a reusable software element possessing
specified and guaranteed property qualities. The notion of contract is helpful to model various
kind of properties. Contracts take place in services as assertions (pre/post-conditions), in com-
ponents as invariants to preserve by the services, or in assemblies as component compatibility
properties. These general contracts should be made precise and extended to cope with the
expressiveness of the considered component models. In particular the interoperability between
components should consider the following properties.
• Static interoperability properties: the compatibility of interface signatures (naming and
typing); does a component give enough information about its interface(s) in order to be
(re)usable by other components ?
• Architectural properties: the availability of the required components, the availability of the
required services, the correctness of the linked component interfaces;
• Functional properties: do the components do what they must do? These correctness
properties may be checked both on each component and on the component assemblies and
compositions.
• Behavioural compatibility : the correct interaction between two or more components which
are combined. The properties depends on the interaction model features: sequential vs.
concurrent, call vs. synchronisations, synchronous vs asynchronous, pair vs. multipart
communication, shared data, atomic/structured actions...
In order to cope with different meaning and different context, we introduce the notion of
multilevel contract. A multilevel contract is a contract defined at different structure level (service,
component, assembly, composition) according to different expected properties. The hierarchical
vision of the contracts provides a convenient framework to master the incremental building of
components and the latter verification process. In the following, we detail the main properties
associated to each level.
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Service contract A contract at the service level expresses that the service terminates in
a consistent state. This contract deals with the behavioural consistency and the functional
correctness properties.
• The behavioural consistency property states that the execution of the service actions does
not lead to inconsistent states (such as deadlock).
• The functional correctness property expresses that a service achieves what it is supposed
to do. The functional correctness of a service of a component is defined here using the
Hoare-style specification (Pre-condition, Statement, Post-condition) where Statement is
the service behaviour. This property should be checked with respect to the requirements
of the owner component.
Component contract At the component level the contract states that this component can be
reused with confidence. It deals with three properties: the component consistency, the protocol
correctness property and also the service accessibility. A component protocol is defined here as
the set of all the valid sequences of service invocations.
• The component consistency property states that the invariant properties of the component
are preserved by all the services embodied in the component. Considering that a compo-
nent equiped with services is consistent if its properties are always satisfied whatever the
behaviour of the services is, one can set a consistency preservation contract between the
services and their owner component to ensure that property.
• The protocol correctness property expresses that the order in which the services are to be
invoked by clients is correct with respect to the rules given by the services’ specification.
• The service accessibility property states that the services defined in the interface of a com-
ponent are available. This is related to intra-component traceability of service dependency.
Assembly contract In an assembly, made of linked trusted components, each component will
contribute to the well-formedness of the links by requiring or ensuring appropriate assertions:
this is the coarse-grained contract. The link establishes a client/supplier relation. The assembly
contract covers correctness properties with four layers:
• The first layer deals with the service signature compatibility among the services of the
interfaces of the assembled components. The service call should respect the service signa-
ture. The signature matching between the involved services of component interfaces covers
at least name resolution, visibility rules, typing and subtyping rules.
• The second layer deals with the service structure consistency of the assembled components.
Assuming that services can be composed from other (sub)services, connecting services is
possible only if their structures are compatible (but not necessary identical).
• The third layer deals with the service compliance of the assembled components. If the
services use a Hoare-like specification, one has to relate their pre-conditions and post-
conditions [29]. The caller pre-condition is stronger than the called one. The called
post-condition is stronger than the caller’s one. Each part involved in the assembly should
fulfil its counterpart of the contract.
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• The fourth layer deals with the behavioural compatibility between the linked services of the
assembled components. Behavioural compatibility is about the correct interaction between
two or more components which are combined through their services.
The following table summarises the crossing of levels and properties (layers) covered by the
multilevel contracts. Note that the composite level is not dealt with in this paper.
service component assembly composite
behavioural consistency component consistency service signature compatibility (ssic) ssic
functional correctness protocol correctness service structure consistency (sstc) sstc
service accessibility service compliance (sco) sco
behavioural compatibility (bhc) bhc
The four layers above are useful to define interoperability levels. A Corba component with
IDL interfaces can be compatible only at the first level with other models. The four layers can
be augmented with other kind of properties like the quality of service.
In Section 3 we provide the details of the global verification process based on the above
levels and contracts. It applies to component models with high level services such as the Kmelia
multiservices component model, which serves as a working context for applying the multilevel
contract definition (Section 4) and its verification (Section 5).
3 Multi-levels Contract Design and Verification Process
This section presents a component-based design process which takes into account the multilevel
contracts. The components and assemblies are assumed to be abstract, meaning that they are
independent from execution platforms. They can be refined or implemented later in centralised
or distributed execution platforms.
As depicted in Figure 1, the process is divided in two phases: the specification phase made
of specification activities and the formal analysis phase made of verification activities. The
workflow is presented as a whole but the activities can be performed iteratively in any order.
From a practical point of view, the specifier would switch from one phase to the other according to
a customised methodology, inspired from top-down or bottom-up approaches, with a component
or system orientation. For example the specifier may iterate on the component level only to
deliver components off the shelf. This design approach allows the reuse of designed components
by making the component descriptions available in a component library.
3.1 Specification phase: making contracts explicit
The specification phase includes three activities: a software system design (assembly/composi-
tion), a software component specification and a service specification. In a top-down approach,
the system design activity starts first. It defines the system as a collection of interacting subsys-
tems and components. If components or assemblies that match the requirements already exist
on the shelf, they can be directly integrated in the system design. Otherwise, the component
specification activity will produce the new component(s). Once the component structure is es-
tablished, the detailed service specification activity proceeds. The main point in this phase is
that the contracts must be explicitly expressed at each level in order to be checked.
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Figure 1: Contract design process
3.2 Formal analysis based on contract checking
The models produced during the specification phase are analysed by checking the contracts.
The verification process iterates on five formal analysis activities as depicted in Figure 1, each
activity refers to contracts of Section 2.
1. The Static analysis activity checks the syntactic correctness at all levels, the service acces-
sibility of the component level, and the static interoperability of the assembly level, which
itself covers the service signature compatibility and the service structure consistency.
2. The Functional correctness activity checks the behavioural consistency property at the
service level and a part of the protocol correctness property at the component level.
3. The Consistency checking activity covers the component consistency property at the com-
ponent level.
4. The Behavioural compatibility activity checks the behavioural consistency property at the
service level, a part of the protocol correctness property at the component level and the
behavioural compatibility at the assembly level.
5. The Assembly/Promotion contracts verification activity checks the service compliance of
the assembled components at the assembly level. The promotion consists in making a com-
ponent feature available at the composite level i.e. a component service can be promoted
as a composite service possibly with restrictions or extensions. The promotion is treated
in the context of composite components, which is out of the scope of this article.
We are not going to deal with all the details of the verification activities. Section 5 provides
a concrete material on how the process is put into practice in the context of COSTO/Kmelia.
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4 Designing Contracts in the Kmelia Component Model
We introduce here the main features of Kmelia, an abstract and formal component model [7]; an
up-to-date formal description of the model can be found in [4]. We illustrate the use of contracts
with a simple bank Automatic Teller Machine (ATM).
The key features of Kmelia are:
• service: a service describes a functionality; it is more than a simple operation; it has a
pre-condition, a post-condition and a behaviour described with a labelled transition system
(LTS). Moreover a service may hierarchically give access to other services. The behaviour
supports communication interactions, dynamic evolution rules and service composition;
• component : a component is a container of services; it is described with a state space
constrained by an invariant. A component is designed independently from its environment
by setting assumptions such as virtual client components or required service specifications;
• assembly of components: an assembly is a set of components linked via their required and
provided services with the aim to build effective functionality. Linking components by
their services in assemblies establishes a possible bridge to Service Oriented Architectures.
The component assemblies are governed by strict service composability rules;
• composite component: a composite component is a component that encapsulates assemblies
or other components; it is subject to encapsulation and promotion policies.
Let us illustrate Kmelia by an ATM case study. This ATM delivers standard services such
as withdrawal via a user interface. Its Kmelia specification is built on an assembly of four
components as depicted in Figure 2. The central ATM CORE handles the ATM bank services;
the USER INTERFACE component controls the user access; the AAC component stands for the bank
management and the LOCAL BANK component holds the local management access. Components
are pairwise linked: a required service is achieved by the provided service it is linked to. An
assembly link is a correspondence between a required service and a provided one according
to mapping relations (names, context, messages, subservices). It materialises the support for
assembly contracts.
aac: AAC
authorization
lb: LOCAL_BANK
balance ask_
account_balance
withdrawal
account_query
ui: USER_INTERFACE
behaviour
ask_for_money
atm: ATM_CORE
codeask_code
amountask_amount
account_update
ask_
authorization
swallow_card
query_account
deposit
transfer
provided service required service
assembly link
service call
Figure 2: A component assembly for the ATM System
A Kmelia component is described by an interface, a state space and service descriptions. The
interface declares the services which are provided or required by the component. The state space
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is a set of variables constrained by an invariant. In Listing 1 the ATM CORE state space includes
an ATM name, an identifier, a set of swallowed cards and the available notes. The CashCard
data type is defined in the user-defined library ATMLIB. The obs prefix denotes a variable with a
read-only access for a linked client service. The invariant predicate states that there is enough
cash to proceed a transaction and the ”bad” card container is not full.
Listing 1: Kmelia specification ATM CORE
COMPONENT ATM CORE
INTERFACE
p r o v i d e s : {wi thd rawa l , accoun t que r y , d e p o s i t , t r a n s f e r }
r e q u i r e s : { a s k a u t h o r i z a t i o n , a s k a c c oun t b a l a n c e }
USES {ATMLIB}
CONSTANTS
obs a v a i l a b l e c a s h : I n t e g e r := 0 ; // ob s e r v a b l e con s t an t
sw a l l ow e d s i z e : I n t e g e r := 100 //non−o b s e r v a b l e con s t an t
VARIABLES
obs a v a i l a b l e n o t e s : I n t e g e r ; // ob s e r v a b l e v a r i a b l e
name : S t r i n g ; //non−o b s e r v a b l e v a r i a b l e s
i d e n t : I n t e g e r ; //ATM i d e n t i f i e r
swa l l owed ca r d s : s e tOf CashCard // kept c a r d s
INVARIANT
@cash d i sp : a v a i l a b l e n o t e s >= 0 ,
@ca r d c apa c i t y : s i z e ( swa l l owed ca r d s ) <= sw a l l ow e d s i z e
INITIALIZATION
a v a i l a b l e n o t e s := 10000 ;
name := ”ATM203” ;
i d e n t := r e a d I n t ( ) ;
swa l l owed ca r d s := emptySet ;
A service may be a non-trivial entity with a state and a dynamic behaviour. A service
may also declare required and provided subservices. All these elements are involved in the
service contract. The service behaviour defines via an extended labelled transition system (eLTS)
the order in which the service performs its actions. Communication actions are primitives for
synchronous interactions between services. The withdraw service achieves a withdrawal on a cash
card, under some controls. Listing 2 illustrates its declaration.
Listing 2: Kmelia specification of ATM services
p r o v i d ed w i thd rawa l ( ca rd : CashCard ) : Boolean
I n t e r f a c e
s u bp r o v i d e s : { i d e n t } # from c a l l e r
c a l r e q u i r e s : { ask code , ask amount }#from auth r c a l l e r
e x t r e q u i r e s : { a s k a u t h o r i z a t i o n } #from anothe r cmp
i n t r e q u i r e s : { swa l l ow ca r d } #from the mys e l f
Pre
a v a i l a b l e n o t e s >= a v a i l a b l e c a s h # enough money
Va r i a b l e s # l o c a l to the s e r v i c e
nbt , c ,m : I n t e g e r ; # c , a : i n pu t code and amount
# nbt : number o f a u t h o r i z e d t r i a l s o f code e n t e r i n g
r ep : Boolean ; #rep : r e p l y from the a u t h o r i z a t i o n
s u c c e s s : Boolean # suc c e s s : r e s u l t o f the w i thd rawa l
Behav io r
// see the c o r r e s p ond i n g LTS f i g u r e
Post
obs @notes : ( r e s u l t=t r u e im p l i e s a v a i l a b l e n o t e s
< o l d ( a v a i l a b l e n o t e s ) )
|| ( r e s u l t= f a l s e && a v a i l a b l e n o t e s == o l d ( a v a i l a b l e n o t e s ) ) ;
// end o f s e r v i c e
End
The corresponding required service ask for money is
defined in the USER INTERFACE component.
r e q u i r e d a sk fo r money ( ca rd : CashCard ) : Boolean
I n t e r f a c e
s u bp r o v i d e s : { code}
// p r o v i d ed to the c a l l e e
V i r t u a l V a r i a b l e s
d i s p e n s a b l e : Boolean ;
// assume t h i s o b s e r v a b l e i n f o rma t i o n
V i r t u a l I n v a r i a n t t r u e
Pre d i s p e n s a b l e
//No LTS
Post not ( Re s u l t ) i m p l i e s d i s p e n s a b l e
// d i s p e n s a b l e may e v o l v e i n the o th e r ca se
End
A required service may have a full service specification in Kmelia, especially if it sets as-
sumptions on any provider service via a virtual context. This allows to define service contracts
separately from assembly contracts and to improve the property verification locality. The con-
text mapping of the lwith link in Listing 3, shows how the virtual context of the required service
is ”instantiated” by an actual context of the provider service.
Listing 3: ”ATM Assembly links”
Assembly
Components atm :ATM CORE ; u i :USER INTERFACE
L ink s // ////////// assemb ly l i n k s //////////
@lw i th : p−r atm . wi thd rawa l u i . a sk fo r money
con t e x t mapping //a k ind o f e x p l i c i t a dap t a t i o n
u i . d i s p e n s a b l e = atm . a v a i l a b l e n o t e s >= 0
s u b l i n k s : { l c o d e , lamount}
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@lamount : r−p atm . ask amount u i . amount
@lcode : r−p atm . ask code u i . code
// the s e r v i c e w i thd rawa l o f the ATM CORE i s connected to
// the s e r v i c e a sk fo r money r e q u i r e d by the USER INTERFACE
The withdrawal behaviour starts with an
identification step: card insertion, password
control, authentication by ACD/ATM Con-
troller (AAC). If the AAC accepts the transac-
tion, the ATM asks for the amount of cash, oth-
erwise the card is ejected and the withdrawal
transaction ends. The given amount is com-
pared with the current card policy limit. When
the allowed amount is lower than the requested
one or if the current ATM cash is not sufficient,
the ATM asks again for the amount of cash.
Otherwise the ATM asks the AAC to process
the transaction, updates the card limit, delivers
the cash and prints a receipt when possible, and
the withdrawal transaction ends after a card
ejection. Two actions (debitCard, ejectCard) rep-
resent functions defined by the specifier in the
user-defined ATMLIB library while display is a
predefined function in Kmelia.
5 Checking Contracts in Kmelia
The verification process is supported by a set of tools integrated into the COSTO (COmponent
Study TOolbox) platform which is a set of Eclipse-based plugins [2] we developed to support the
specification and analysis of Kmelia component systems. COSTO manages the Kmelia specifica-
tions and handles the verification of the primary properties (syntactic analysis, type checking,
static analysis, ...) as depicted in Figure 3. The verifications of complex properties such as
deadlock freeness, component or assembly consistency are delegated to other appropriate ex-
ternal tools. Let us assume here that the static verifications (syntactic, type, well-formedness
checking) are already performed by the COSTO tool; we show how other verification tools are
used to check contracts.
5.1 Checking a service contract: functional correctness
The basic idea is to evaluate all the paths of a service behaviour (B) and to determine whether
they are compliant with the post-condition or not. Actually this is a non-trivial problem similar
to the one of model-checking code. To prove this property we investigated B tools, including
ProB a model checker for B. We had to turn back to more appropriate tools because B tools
needed additional material to prove loop invariants and ProB was not powerful enough. In this
section we present an investigation using the Key1 tool [8]. Key accepts JML specifications as
1http://www.key-project.org
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Figure 3: COSTO Framework Overview
input; therefore we defined a process to compute JML specifications from Kmelia services. An
ongoing plugin called Kml2Jml implements this process (Figure 3). Each Kmelia component
C is translated to a Java class C.java where: each provided service of C becomes a method of
the C.java class and each required service of C becomes a method of a virtual component class
denoted by an instance variable vc : VC in the C class. The LTS that specifies B is translated
in two steps into a Java code. The translation is not straightforward, due to the gap between
the LTS structure and the structured programming control structures of Java. The first step
introduces the control structure by converting the LTS into a syntax tree, which is an extension
of the well-known regular expressions formalism. The second step computes the Java code from
the syntax tree.
Algorithm (step1): From LTS to Syntax tree Let L(B) bet the set of possible behaviours
of a service srv. Since B can be seen as an automaton, the syntax tree E such that L(E) = L(B)
is generated by the algorithm of McNaughton/Yamada (cf. Kleene’s theorem in [24]).
Algorithm (step2): From syntax tree to Java It is straightforward from the previously
obtained syntax tree. The main idea is to transform the product (.) as a sequence operator (;
in Java), the Union (+) as a conditional structure (if else ...)2, and the Kleene star (∗) as a
recursive method modeling E∗. The body of this method describes a statement block repeated
in the LTS. The resulting Java code annotated with JML specifications is checked using the Key
tool.
Example. Let us check the functional correctness of the withdrawal provided service of the
ATM Core component. Applied to the Java representation of the withdrawal service, the Key tool
analysis revealed some errors. As an example, the post-condition of withdrawal was not satisfied:
the error was due to the addition of amount to availaible notes instead of subtracting it. After
correcting this mistake, and regenerating the Java code, Key proved it correct automatically
with 654 symbolic states and 18 path conditions.
2Note that even non-deterministic choice in LTS can be modeled by an if-else construction over an abstract
variable that could be refined later by developer
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5.2 Checking a component contract: component consistency
Here the deal is to reuse B tools like Atelier-B3 and Rodin4 because the B provers are appropriate
to prove that kind of property, considering the fact that most of the Kmelia data types and
expression are translatable in B. We developed a plugin named Kml2B in COSTO (Figure 3) that
extracts (Event-)B specifications. For each Kmelia component C, an (Event-)B model called C
is built. Its state space is extracted from the component’s one. The provided services srvi in C
are translated into srv i operations within the C model. The extracted specification is imported
and checked in Atelier-B or Rodin. The B tools enables the verification of invariant consistency
at the Kmelia level. The full translation procedure is explained in [19].
Example. After extracting (Event-)B models by running the Kml2B plugin, the ATM Core
model is used to prove the preservation of invariant by its provided services. We proved conse-
quently the consistency of the invariant component. However, if the post-condition is modified as
available notes<= old(available notes) then the invariant available notes>= 0 is not preserved
anymore. This error was easily detected with the B tools.
5.3 Checking assembly contracts
Checking an assembly contract engages four verifications steps: (i) the matching of the service
signatures (up to parameter renaming), (ii) the service dependency consistency, (iii) the matching
of the service pre/post-conditions and (iv) the behavioural compatibility of services. Step (i)
and (ii) are performed by checking static interoperability.
5.3.1 Checking the static interoperability
This verification includes: type checking, signature matching, component and service interfaces
structure matching, observability rules, and service availability (requirements, subservices). The
COSTO tool performs these analysis by using simple correspondence checking algorithms, graph
algorithms and standard typing algorithms. Static analysis of these contracts helps to detect
some incompatibilities; therefore the component designer may correct its component at design
time. This corresponds to the ”Static Analysis” step in Figure 1. The reader can find more
details of this analysis in [4].
Example. Figure 4 shows the Kmelia editor in the Eclipse IDE, and a sample of the kind of
errors (typing, observability, incompleteness of the mapping) that are detected. Besides standard
completion, the editor supports smart completion in the case of assembly links. In Figure 4,
only required services defined in the User Interface component type are proposed and the user
is warned that some of them do not match the exact signature of the provided service withdraw
which is defined in the ATM Core component type.
5.3.2 Checking the service contracts compliance
Based on an assembly link, the main issue is to decide whether the provided service matches
with the required service it is linked to. The matching condition is: the pre-condition of required
3http://www.atelierb.eu/
4http://rodin-b-sharp.sourceforge.net
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Figure 4: Error detection and smart completion in COSTO/Kmelia
service Req is stronger than the one of provided service Prov and the post-condition of Req is
weaker than the one of Prov. In term of B proof obligations this property is rewritten as: the
provided service refines the required service (considering the adaptation defined in the context
mapping of the link). The refinement relation leads to the generation of specific proof obligations
in (Event-)B. In practice we reuse the work presented in Section 5.2. We extend it by generating
B machines for the required services and for the refinement relation. For each required service
Req in a component C, one (Event-)B model Req is created before checking the consistency of the
virtual context of the service Req. The same (Event-)B model is refined by Req Prov Ref. The
state space of the machine Req is obtained by translating the virtual context of service Req, and
the operation req is the translation of the service Req. The full details of the translation schema
and the proof obligations are available in [5] while the Kml2B plugin is introduced in [19].
Example. The analysis of the assembly link lwith between the required service ask for money
and the provided service withdraw ref with the AtelierB reveals some errors that were introduced
intentionally in the specification of ask for money for experimental purpose. The post-condition
(not( result ) implies not ( dispensable )) means that if result is f alse then the available notes is less
than 0 which can not be deduced from the withdraw ref post-condition. Then the service contract
compliance (Post(waithdraw re f )⇒ Post (ask f or money)) is not fulfilled. After correcting the
error, the resulting B machines generated 28 proof obligations which were all proved by the
AtelierB prover in Automatic mode.
5.3.3 Checking behavioural compatibility
This verification focus on the synchronous communication actions between services (start/end
of services, send/receive message) defined in the Kmelia model. Checking behavioural com-
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patibility is a widely studied topic [28, 6, 11]. It often relies on checking the behaviour of a
(component-based) system through the construction of a finite state automaton. We adopt a
pairwise verification approach that avoids state explosion as described in [6]. Hence for each as-
sembly link, including the sublinks that share the same communication channel, the behavioural
compatibility verification is applied. Instead of developping the checker we turned to existing
model checkers because ensuring dynamic behavioural compatibility is usual target property of
communicating processes and transition systems. Currently we target MEC and CADP tools.
In order to exploit the CADP tools [16], we encode the Kmelia components into Lotos processes
which are the input of the CADP tools. The behavioural compatibility is based on communica-
tion between processes. A plugin named Kml2Lotos have been developed in a previous work [7].
The resulting Lotos process can be checked using CADP tool. An alternative solution based
on MEC model checker have been also experimented.
Example. The experimentations led to detect message inconsistencies. The error made by
the specifier was to put a message reception in a loop for one service and a single sent message
in the communication service. The deadlock was reached in case of a second pass in the loop.
The MEC translator Kml2Mec and a full experimentation with MEC can be found in [3].
6 Related Works
Using contracts for components is not a new topic. However to the best of our knowledge the
related approaches do not integrate contracts the way we propose. Contracts for component have
been described in [26]. That proposal considers functional and extra-functional contracts and
dynamic behaviours to provide trust-by-contract components. However the main issue of that
work is software quality; the proof of the contracts is not treated at the design level. Beugnard
et al.[10] investigated a typology of component contracts and classified contracts in four levels.
Basically syntactic contracts (i) are taken into account by all component models. The more
relevant semantic constraints such as behavioural contracts (ii) and synchronisation contracts
(iii) are encountered in specific component models. Finally the quality of service (iv) is often
delegated to runtime models.
In ConFract [14] the contracts are independent entities associated to several participants,
while Kmelia attaches them mainly to services and links. The ConFract contracts support a
rely/guarantee mechanism with respect to the vertical composition of Fractal components [13].
The executable assertions language CCL-J enables to express specifications at the interface level
and the component levels. In the case of CCL-J, when a method of an interface is called, the
contract controller is notified and it applies the checking rules. As for the pre-conditions, the
post-conditions and the method invariants of all contracts ”are checked at runtime”. CCL-J is
used to validate the contracting mechanisms of ConFract but CCL-J is much simpler than JML
in terms of available constructs. In [25] the definition of Meyer’s contracts and subcontracts is
assumed, which led to rules similar to those of Kmelia. But the interpretation of pre-conditions
and post-conditions is done in terms of call sequences rather than in logical predicates. This
relies on behavioural contracts rather than functional contracts. In Kmelia, the behavioural
contracts are treated separately using behaviour compatibility rules [7]. The SOFA component
model and its behaviour protocol formalism [23], based on regular expressions, allow the designer
to verify the conformance of a component’s implementation to its specification; this verification
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is done at runtime. But no service contracts compliance is handled.
Architecture Description Languages represent software architectures in terms of components
and their overall interconnection structure. Many of these languages support formal notations
to specify components and connectors behaviours. For example, Wright [1] and Darwin [17] use
CSP-based notations. These formalisms allow to verify correctness of component assemblies, to
check properties such as deadlock freedom. However most of the works applying formal verifi-
cations in ADLs focus on component interactions, but very few studies addressed the contract
issue using pre/post-conditions. Apart from the syntactic contracts level (i), the behavioural
contracts (ii) and the synchronisation contracts (iii) are also proved at design time in Kmelia.
We do not deal with further constraints such as quality of service, because they depend on data
known only at runtime.
Contracts and services have been studied in the context of service composition. From a
service composition point of view e.g. BPEL, the behavioural aspect is dominant [9]. Considering
only the formal models, composition is mainly based on automata, Petri nets and process algebra,
as illustrated by the orchestration calculus of Mazzara and Lanese [18]; therefore the contracts
focus mainly on dynamic compatibility. Conversely the contracts (in the sense of design-by-
contract) are taken into account in [22] (using abstract machines) but not the dynamic behaviour.
Kmelia cares of both aspects. In [12], the contract is supported at four levels (signature, quality
of service, ontology, behaviour) but none of them handle the functional contract. The component
architecture (SCA) approaches [15] emphasize the service concept, like Kmelia does; but contract
features are not introduced yet in SCA.
7 Conclusion
We have presented how a set of correctness properties of components may be guaranteed by
stating and verifying contracts at the level of services, components and assemblies. We have
illustrated the idea through the Kmelia model which is equiped with a rich data language that
enables to incorporate pre/post-conditions at a service level, invariant at a component level, and
behavioural contract at an assembly level. Consequently, property verification is achieved by
checking the contracts at the different levels. The automation of the process is undertaken by
considering extractions from the Kmelia specification language to generate the specifications in
the input language of existing tools such as theorem-provers or model-checkers depending on the
targeted properties. The use of a multilevel contracts makes it easy to define interoperability
policy. For instance static interoperability exploits low level pre/post-conditions and helps us
to check the correctness of assemblies. This may be generalised to assemblies of heterogeneous
components, provided that a standard pre/post-condition mechanism is defined and respected.
CBSE lacks standard practices in order to raise a large-scale, open use of components. The
road to a wide spread component-based software engineering is simplicity, ease of use, availability
of well-defined, standard, free and useful components and interfaces. The Unix operating system
is a convincing example that makes the proof of the concept, at a different level; the simple use
of Unix .h header interfaces, the simple combination of Unix commands and options, the simple
use of unstructured files, the conformance of the standard interfaces including network levels, are
recognised as the main points for the development of operating system components that make
the success of the Unix software family. We expect that first order logic integrated in high-level
programming languages or operating systems as the use of script languages, can play a similar
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role of interface standardisation for CBSE. We are working in this direction via the reuse and the
extension of existing standard relational database languages (the SQL family) which are already
integrated in various operating system features.
Perspectives. A short term perspective of our work is to make the tools used at different levels
more integrated with helpful feedback into the Kmelia specifications. We are working on a
translation of a subset of Kmelia into the Fractal component model which has a Java execution
environment but lacks property verification means. We expect to favour interoperability between
the models and also to find some simulation facilities that will be complementary with the formal
analysis aspect provided by Kmelia.
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